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Farmer: The Justice and His Fees

STUDENT NOTES
THE JUSTICE AND HIS FEES
One John Williams, charged with a misdemeanor,' attacked
the very power of the justice of the peace to try the case on the
ground that the latter had a direct pecuniary interest in the result arising under the statutory fee system. Under that system,
all claims of justices for fees in misdemeanor cases, not paid directly by the defendant, were payable exclusively from the socalled "general school fund", no justice being permitted to draw
from the fund a greater amount in fees than he himself contributed to it in fines.2 In one of the most important local decisions
of recent years, 3 the court, in issuing the writ of prohibition, held
that since it was necessary to convict in an appreciable number of
cases in order to secure payment of fees, the justice was wholly
disqualified by interest.
Those who are convinced that the fee system is pernicious4
will applaud this decision without being over-critical of its
rationale. On principle, the case undoubtedly reaches a desirable
result. The practice of allowing justices of the peace no compensation except by fees5 collected from the convicted," while rarely
1 The misdemeanor consisted of carrying an oversupply of powder into a
mine in violation of W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 22, art. 2, § 63.
2 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931)
e. 50, art. 17, § 14, and c. 7, art. 5, § 15.
See also c. 50, art. 17, § 11, providing for the amount of fees payable. The
history of these sections is interesting. Before the 1931 revision, the justice
was not limited by the amount in fines that he contributed. The revisers explained that the fees were made payable only out of the fines paid in by that
particular justice "so that the dilatory justice cannot profit by the diligence
of some other justice".
3 Williams v. Brannen, 178 S. E. 67 (W. Va. 1935).
4 This seems to be the concensus of opinion among legal writers and members of the profession generally, in this state and elsewhere. See Xceler,
Our Justice of the Peace Courts - A Problem in Justice (1930) 9 TENN. L.
REV. 1; Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City (1913)
26 HAmRI. L. REv. 302; Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United
States (1926) 15 CAL. L. REv. 118; ?eport of Committee on Judicial Ad.
ministration and Legal Reforn, OHIO STATE BAa Ass'I REP. (1935) (mid.
winter meeting) 555; Sommerville, Justices and Their Courts (1895) 2 W.
VA. BAa 45; Simms, Address: W. VA. BAR Ass'N REP. (1930) 41.
5Apparently most states "provide only fee compensation for their minor
courts", although most of them have statutes mahing the county or state
liable therefor. See note (1927) 36 YALE. L. J. 1171, 1173; see also Smith,
Op. cit. supra n. 4, at 120, n. 8.
The United States Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47
S. C. 437 (1926), lists seven states, not including West Virginia, where such
a system then prevailed.
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questioned, 7 is plainly unjustifiable. It will be noted, however, that
the fee system creating the interest was statutory, which would
ordinarily necessitate, under our legal system, the discovery of a
constitutional peg upon which to hang its invalidity.
The court, in relying primarily on the common law maxim,
nemo debet esse judex in propriacausa, to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the stautory scheme in question, apparently

ignores the above-mentioned requirement.8 It is evident, however,
that what the court actually intends is that, apart from the written

constitution, the maxim "no man can be judge in his own cause"
is deemed too sanctified for legislative circumvention. This doctrine, illustrating nicely the strong common law bias of the
judiciary, is not entirely unsupported. It dates from Lord Coke's
famous dictum in Bonham's Case,9 and, although probably largely
repudiated by later English judges, 10 has been followed in some
American decisions," having previously been approved by way
of dictum by the West Virginia Court.' 2 Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether such a natural law concept has any legitimate place
in our own political society, which intends an omnipotent legiss
lature within the confines of the written constitution.'
The true basis for the decision appears to be that first
14
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Tumey v. Oio, and re7 It is suggested that the acquiescence in this practice is probably due to
the insignificance of the amounts involved in cases falling within the jurisdiction of such officers. See note (1927) 50 A. L. R. 1256, 1258. Again, it
has been attributed to the absolute right of appeal from the decision. See
Keeler, op. cit. supra n. 4.
8 This is apparent from the fact that the court cites two West Virginia
cases as establishing the inviolability of the maxim in this state. Findiey v.
Smith, 42 W. Va. 299, 26 S. E. 370 (1895); and City of Grafton v. Holt, 58
W. Va. 182, 52 S. E. 21'(1905). In these cases the constitutionality of a
statute is not involved, the interest of the judge arising wholly apart from
statute.
9 For an interesting and instructive discussion of this case and its history,
see Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Beviw (1926) 40 HARV. L. REV.
30.
10 Ibid. at 58 et seg.
1Fearse v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324 (1816) ; Winans v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. 394
(1873). In the latter case it was said, p. 403: "The maxim under consideration has always been regarded in English jurisprudence as elementary and
fundamental in judicial action, and I think can no more be materially invaded
by the legislature than it could pass an act that a judge might decide accord-

ing to lot .... ""
2Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle, 54 W. Va. 210, 216, 46 S.E. 258 (1903).
13 "Common right is vague at best and cannot compare with a well drawn

constitution as a check upon legislative action." Plueknett, op. cit. supra n.
9. For a discussion of the theory that there is an unwritten as well as a

written constitution, see McClain, Unwritten Constitutions in the United
States (1902) 15 HAav. L. REV. 531.
14Supra n. 6.
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affirmed in the present case.15 In that case Chief Justice Taft
declared that "every procedure which would offer possible
temptation- to the average man as judge to forget the burden of
proof required to convict the defendant .... denies the latter due
process of law." 10 Due process, guaranteed by both federal 7 and
state' 8 constitutions, restrains the legislature, 9 and certainly
nothing is more essential to its existence than a trial by an impartial and disinterested judge. It is, of course, permissible to look
to the established procedure and rules of common law for a definition of due process in any particular case, 20 and it is in this
regard that the extreme sensitiveness of the common law to a
financially interested judge performs its legitimate function.
Another aspect of the decision merits consideration. Prohibition lies for lack of jurisdiction 21 and, therefore, in order for
the writ to issue here, it was necessary to hold that the justice had
a disqualifying interest in the case from its very inception, 22 i. e.,
from the time the warrant was issued. Otherwise, the statutes
creating the interest in the result of the case being void, the justice,
no longer having any interest in the actual trial, would still retain
his jurisdiction of the cause. In the light of the fact that any fee
system of remuneration would embody this same interest in
instigating litigation this view of the case assumes great importance.
Although the instant case affects the status of the fee system
only in regard to criminal proceedings, its existence in civil cases
is equally vicious.2" With respect to the latter, the interest of the
justice is in encouraging litigation so as to increase the sum total
of his fees. And obviously, this interest is best furthered by render'5 Syllabus 2.

le Tumey v. Ohio, supra n. 6, at 532.

'17 U. S. CoNsT., Amend. XIV, § 1.
18W . VA. CONST., Art. III, § 10.
'9 Burdick, THE LAW op THE AuEBIcA-N CONSTOuTION (1st ed. 1922)

§

233.

See also Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 15 L.

Ed.
2 372 (1855).
0oMurray

v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., supra n.19.

21W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 53, art. 1, § 1. "The writ of
shall lie ....
when the inferior court has not jurisdiction ... ."

prohibition

For cases
holding that prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent action by a judge
who is disqualified by interest, see Price v. Sturgiss, 82 W. Va. 523, 97 S. E.
193 (1918); Coal Co. v. Doolittle, supra n. 12.
22 With respect to this point the court said: "The prospect for fees arising
from his (the petitioner's) arrest might have influenced the issuance of the
warrant. The stream from the fountain of justice must be pure from its
very source."
23

L.

See generally the references in n. 4, supra. See also note (1927) 13
(N.S.) 367; Note (1928) 36 YALE L. T. 1171.

VA.

BEG.
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ing verdicts favorable to those who bring the "business" to the
court.
The decision in the instant case made imperative legislation
to save our inferior courts from atrophy. For obvious reasons the
substitution of a salary for fees would have been desirable.2 '
Nevertheless, the recently enacted statutes pretended to be nothing
more than a variation of the fee system.
The effect of the new statutes is to entitle the justice of the
peace to a flat fee of three dollars25 in each criminal case and proceeding, for which sum the county is liable.2" No longer limited
in his recovery of fees to the amount of fines which he pays in,
the justice's interest in convicting the defendant has disappeared.
It is apparent, on the other hand, *that nothing in the statutes
obviates the pecuniary interest of the justice in instigating criminal litigation in order to increase the sum total of his fees. This
being true, the instant case, as understood by the writer, renders
the validity of the present scheme doubtful.
The present case, subjects to the searchlight of informed
opinion the entire justice of the peace system. There are those
who believe that a drastic reorganization of our inferior courts
has become imperative.2 7 So firmly entrenched, however, in our
constitution 8 is the justice of the peace court that anything approaching complete abolition would necessitate a constitutional
amendment.2" True, there is no constitutional prohibition against
24 A bill to that, effect was introduced and referred to the Committee on
tue Judiciary. See H. B. No. 56. This bill would have provided for a salary
of from $300 to $1500 per annum, to be fixed in advance by the county court.
2, The emergency act passed Jan. 17, 1935, and effective from passage, fixed
this fee at one dollar. See H. B. No. 65. This sum was in lieu of the variable
amount formerly provided. See W. VA.REv. CODE (1931) c. 50, art. 17, § 11.
The fee was increased to its present amount by the Committee Substitute for
H. B. No. 56, passed Mfar. 9, 1935, and effective from passage.
20 This change was effected by H. B. No. 64, passed Jan. 17, 1935, and
effective from passage, amending W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 7, art. 5, § 15,
and H. B. No. 56 (Committee Substitute) amending W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
c. 50, art. 17, § 14.
27See n. 4, supra. See also Harley, Ultinmate Types of Inferior Courts
(1916) 22 CAs. AND Com. 3; Efficient Local Courts (1919) 3 Am. J. Soc. 13;
Bep. Com'a On W. Va. Court. (1930) 30-32.
28 See W. VA. CoNST., art. 8, § 1, expressly vesting general judicial power
in the justice of the peace. See also art. 8, § 26, providing for the division
of each county into districts, with a minimum of one justice in each 'district.
By the constitution, the justice is given civil jurisdiction in "actions of
assumpsit, debt, detinue, and trover" if the amount in controversy does not
exceed $300. No criminal jurisdiction is expressly provided. It is merely
stated that the justice shall have such criminal jurisdiction as the legislature
shall
provide. See W. VA. CoNsT., art. 8, § 28.
2
9 See the proposed amendment of the Commission on the Constitution of
West Virginia, supra n. 27. The gist of the proposal is to take from the
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putting the justice on a salary, or against imposing upon the office
certain qualifications in the nature of legal training and experience. But while the former change would seem desirable, the
practicability of the latter, under the present system, appears
doubtful.30
There is no dearth of suggested plans looking toward the
establishment of a substitute court. 1 The situation is somewhat
the establishment of a substitute court.31 The situation is somewhat
complicated by the fact that the justice performs, apart from the
actual trial of cases, a useful function as a conservator of the
peace, and by the additional fact that there seems to be a real
need for some sort of a "poor man's court". 3 2 Likewise, while the
experience of other states will be instructive, any successful
scheme must, of necessity, consider peculiar local conditions and
requirements. The consideration, and many others serve to caution
us that action, without careful study and deliberation, is not
advisable.

-Guy

OTTO FAumr.

justice all of his civil jurisdiction, leaving him little more than the traditional
conservator of the peace.
20 The thought is that it would be difficult in many rural districts at least
to find qualified attorneys who would assume the duties of the office.
31 See n. 27, supra; and see Bemedy Proposed For Justices' Court. (1928)
11 Am. JuD. Soc. 30.
Practically all suggested plans would abolish the Justice of the peace as a
judicial officer, or strictly limit his powers, and set up in his stead some form
of county court, to be a court of record, with a qualified judge, on a salary
basis, with appeal for cause and not as a matter of right.
It is, of course, possible under our state constitution, which provides for the
establishment of inferior courts, to set up a county court with concurrent
jurisdiction with the justice without the neccesity of a constitutional amendment.

See W. VA. CoNST. art. 8,

§

19.

See Sommerville, op. ct. supra n. 4; Rockel, Justice of Poace's Court
(1914) 78 CENT. L. J. 23, discussing the Kansas experiment in small claims
courts.
32
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